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I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent events have occasioned reconsideration of the purpose
of lawyer-client confidentiality and its exceptions. The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, completed after twelve years of
drafting and debate,' reexamined both the fiduciary duty of confiden-
tiality, found in both the lawyer professional codes and the law of
agency, and the evidentiary client-lawyer privilege, which blocks dis-
closure of client confidences in litigation. Just as the Restatement pro-
cess was concluding, the American Bar Association established the
Ethics 2000 Commission to reexamine the lawyer codes and recom-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
• Stoepler Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. Pro-
fessor Martyn served as an advisor to the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers from 1988 to 2000, and as a member of the
American Bar Association's Ethics 2000 Commission from 1987 to 2002.
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mend revisions to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 Most of
the final revisions recommended by the Commission have now met
with approval in the ABA House of Delegates, which in turn has led
over forty jurisdictions to consider these amendments as a template
for their own professional codes.3 The Restatement and Ethics 2000
undertakings have resulted in a remarkably similar consensus about
the appropriate justifications for client-lawyer confidentiality and the
equally important rationales that justify exceptions to the professional
obligation.
In this Article, I examine the reasons that confidentiality remains
a bedrock fiduciary obligation for lawyers as well as the foundation for
the attorney-client privilege. In Part II, I trace the history and pur-
pose of this professional obligation, revealing two main moral justifi-
cations, efficient operation of the legal system and the promotion of
trust and privacy in the client-lawyer relationship. In Part III, I ex-
amine these same rationales as the justification for exceptions to the
fiduciary duty, focusing on the exceptions articulated by both the Re-
statement and the revised Model Rules. I conclude that the current
scope of confidentiality protection and most of the exceptions created
by these two bodies of law accurately implement the central purposes
of confidentiality. Each jurisdiction therefore should seriously con-
sider revising its own lawyer codes and common law to recognize these
exceptions and their underlying purposes.
II. DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY
The recognition of confidentiality as a core professional obligation
first arose in cases applying the attorney-client privilege, which Wig-
more dates to the seventeenth century.4 In the twentieth century, the
idea that lawyers were forbidden from disclosing client confidences in
litigation created the basis for the recognition in agency law of a
broader professional obligation of confidentiality as an integral part of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty that lawyer-agents owe to client-princi-
pals.5 Beginning about 100 years ago, both the attorney-client privi-
lege and the agency duty of confidentiality became incorporated into
2. For a complete account of the Commission's work, see Margaret Colgate Love,
The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Summary of the Work of
Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002). The Commission's recommen-
dations are also available on-line at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html.
3. See James Podgers, Lawyer Ethics in a State of Flux, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 46,
46.
4. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069-70 (1978).
5. See RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF AGENCY § 395 (1933) (including a prohibition
against using or disclosing confidential information with other duties of loyalty).
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lawyer codes as the obligation not to divulge the confidences and
secrets of a client.6
Throughout this legal development, two distinct but complemen-
tary reasons have been put forward to justify client-lawyer confidenti-
ality. Each is tied to a different philosophical tradition, and each
provides some, but not complete guidance in understanding this pro-
fessional obligation.7 Both justifications begin with an understanding
of a reciprocal inequality inherent in the client lawyer relationship.
On the one hand, clients have the power to select, supervise and fire
lawyers, and to decide when a lawyer acts in the client's best interests.
On the other, lawyers have knowledge and skill that enables them to
use or abuse client information for their own or others' benefit. 8
A utilitarian justification for protecting confidentiality focuses on
the consequences of such a legal protection. Such a rationale usually,
but not always, concludes that confidentiality promotes the greatest
good for the greatest number, because it encourages clients to give
lawyers facts, which are essential to making the legal system work. A
utilitarian rationale also promotes the use of lawyers and the legal
system as an efficient and fair alternative to other means of resolving
disputes. The difficulty of measuring the full consequences of confi-
dentiality or its exceptions makes this rationale less than complete.
Nevertheless, utilitarian reasoning can be used to focus on competing
consequences and as a rough estimation of their relative importance.
However, in searching for the greatest good for the greatest number,
utilitarians can ignore or discount unjustified harm to a minority of
those who do not benefit. For this reason, most moral philosophers
supplement utilitarian reasoning with an understanding of funda-
mental rights that protect individuals from unjust oppression.
6. See, e.g., NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1998); ABA CANONS
OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908) ("The obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters ad-
versely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has
been reposed.").
7. Because I focus here on general rules that guide professional behavior, I follow
the "theoretical-juridical" template of most discussions of ethics over the past
century that pictures "morality as an individually action-guiding system within
or for a person." MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS: A FEMI-
NIST STUDY IN ETHICS 61 (1998). I do not mean to ignore the fact that morality
consists in practice as well as theory, but instead focus here on whether the the-
ory that guides practice makes sense.
8. This understanding also informs feminist notions of morality, which begin by
seeking to reveal the power in relationships that can favor a particular normative
point of view. See, e.g., ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMININE AND FEMINIST ETHICS 158-84
(1993); Margaret Urban Walker, Seeing Power in Morality: A Proposal for Femi-
nist Naturalism in Ethics, in FEMINISTS DOING ETHICS 3-14 (Peggy DesAutels &
Joanne Waugh eds., 2001).
[Vol. 81:13201322
CLIENT-LAWYER CONFIDENTIALITY
The moral theory most often relied on to support a concern for indi-
vidual human rights is deontological. This rationale stems from the
proposition that a morally correct action or rule conforms to some
principle of duty, which can exist independent of consequences. Ac-
tions are blameworthy if they violate these duties. According to this
explanation, confidentiality promotes respect for human autonomy by
guaranteeing trust and privacy in the client-lawyer relationship. Such
a justification also mirrors other rights-based justifications that pro-
mote individual respect in our society. Deontological theories have
the advantage of focusing on individual rights and are especially help-
ful in assessing whether or not people are treated fairly. They provide
less guidance, however, about what to do when two fundamental val-
ues collide because they offer little help in deciding which duty is
stronger.
Both of these philosophical justifications can be found in the legal
literature justifying the obligation of client confidentiality as well as
the cases and rules that justify exceptions to the doctrine. Examining
these rationales can help us better understand current law, the excep-
tions still under debate, and the issues yet to come. 9
A. Utilitarian Justifications
Utilitarians begin their analysis of morally right action by count-
ing consequences and searching for the greatest good for the greatest
number. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, for example, be-
lieved that the ethical validity of conduct should be determined by its
effect on the aggregate happiness. With respect to client-lawyer confi-
dentiality, utilitarians form two groups: the true believers and the
naysayers. The true believers include most lawyers and probably
most clients, as well as nearly every court in this country. The
naysayers constitute a tiny minority, but use similar utilitarian calcu-
lations to reach opposite results. Neither group has good empirical
data to support its conclusion.
True believers begin their utilitarian justification of the confidenti-
ality obligation by reminding us that the legal system exists as an al-
ternative to ad hoc results and, ultimately, anarchy. For this reason,
citizens with disputes should be encouraged to bring them to the legal
system for resolution, where compliance with legal norms will pro-
mote peaceful, fair, and efficient results.1 0 A slightly different varia-
tion on this theme emphasizes the importance of the legal system in
9. For a similar discussion of the Kutak Commission's original Model Rules propos-
als see Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A "Philosoph-
ically Informed" and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177 (1986).
10. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 243 (1986) (discuss-
ing the policy behind the confidentiality privilege).
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promoting economic efficiency and finds lawyers essential to that
function.'"
Confidentiality encourages clients to disclose facts that lawyers
need to handle a legal matter by assuring them that disclosure will
not result in adverse consequences. 12 To do their job, lawyers need
complete and accurate facts, both about what has already occurred
and about what the client contemplates doing. Receiving these facts is
essential to offering legal advice, because legal obligations and reme-
dies depend upon factual circumstances that justify the legal interven-
tion. Lacking accurate facts, the lawyer will either apply the wrong
law, give incorrect legal advice, or both, which in turn will reduce pub-
lic confidence in the legal system and in lawyers.13
The naysayers use utilitarian reasoning to reach the conclusion
that confidentiality actually harms society and the legal system. Jer-
emy Bentham, for example, argued that the attorney-client privilege
should be abolished because it hid the truth from the courts and al-
lowed those with something to hide to get away with unlawful behav-
ior. Bentham reasoned that the object of the criminal law should be to
let "no man ... have it in his power to flatter himself with the hope of
safety, in the event of his engaging in the commission of an act which
the law, on account of its mischievousness, has thought fit to pro-
hibit."14 To those worried about "the safety of the innocent," he ar-
gued that "an innocent man could not be endangered by his lawyer's
telling all he has to tell."' 5 It is important to note that Bentham wrote
at a time when no privilege against self-incrimination existed, so he
reasoned that getting the facts from the lawyer was no different than
getting them from the mouth of the defendant in a criminal case. 16
Bentham wrote about the attorney-client privilege, or the effect of
confidentiality on disclosures in litigation. More recent naysayers ar-
gue that we should apply his arguments to abolish all confidentiality
rules, including the professional codes, which apply both inside and
outside of litigation. Nearly all of their examples focus on litigation,
however, and their conclusions follow from thinking about the privi-
11. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In
Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 238-56
(1995).
12. Moore, supra note 9, at 215.
13. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY AND REGULATION 64 (2002).
14. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 310 (Garland Publ'g, Inc.
1978) (1827).
15. 5 id. at 317.
16. Or, as Bentham put it: "The party himself having been, as he ought to be, previ-
ously subjected to interrogation; his lawyer's evidence, which, though good of its
kind, is no better than hearsay evidence, would not often add any new facts to
those which had already been extracted from the lips of the client." 5 id. at 324.
1324 [Vol. 81:1320
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lege in the context of whether or not evidence should be presented to a
tribunal.
The modern naysayers begin by noting that if the privilege benefits
the guilty, it also harms the innocent, because "the privilege makes it
more difficult for the innocent credibly to communicate that they have
nothing to hide."17 Beyond harming innocent clients, they argue that
lawyers, rather than clients or the legal system, benefit most from
confidentiality rules in three ways. First, lawyers easily would be-
come demoralized if they were compelled to testify against clients.
Sheltering client confidences and lawyer work product with legal pro-
tections results in a more agreeable psychological world, where law-
yers can be committed to clients' goals without conflicting obligations.
Second, confidentiality serves as an effective tool that assists lawyers
to be competent in representing clients, because it encourages clients
to give up important but perhaps embarrassing facts.18 Third, shel-
tering client communications in professional obligations of confidenti-
ality means that lawyers can compete more effectively in the service
economy against other professionals, such as investment bankers and
accountants. This is because lawyers can sell confidentiality obliga-
tions as part of a professional service, something no other professional
group except physicians can guarantee. 19 Unfortunately, these bene-
fits inure to lawyers, but not to clients, who might be better off with
services from other professionals or with alternative dispute resolu-
tion services apart from a governmentally sponsored court system.
It would be wonderful if we could measure the facts behind these
assumptions to determine whether the true believers or the naysayers
are correct. The little empirical evidence we have suggests that the
true believer's may be correct, but the effect of confidentiality may not
be as strong as most lawyers believe. Two small surveys of clients and
lawyers, one focusing on the attorney-client privilege 20 and one on the
general fiduciary duty of confidentiality 2 1 provide the basis for these
tentative conclusions.
These studies document that clients have a general understanding
of confidentiality and expect it as part of the client-lawyer relation-
ship. Further, some clients rely on this professional obligation when
they disclose information to lawyers. This leads most lawyers to sub-
scribe to the "conventional wisdom,"2 2 that receiving confidential in-
17. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 (1998).
18. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTIcE 64 (1980)
19. See Fischel, supra note 17, at 5-6.
20. Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Impli-
cations for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1261-73
(1962).
21. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REV. 351, 352 (1989).
22. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 127
(2d ed., LexisNexis 2002) (1990).
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formation assists them in understanding the matter and in helping
them dissuade clients from wrongdoing.2 3 Finally, however, none of
these tentative conclusions tell us much about the extent to which ex-
ceptions to confidentiality undermine these assumptions. In fact, cli-
ents consistently believe that lawyers are allowed or required to
disclose in more situations than currently are recognized by either the
privilege or the lawyer codes.2 4
The conventional or true believer's utilitarian justification appears
as a basis for the fiduciary duty of confidentiality found in the lawyer
codes and also as the main foundation for the evidentiary equivalent
found in the client-lawyer and work product privileges. These as-
sumptions are reflected in the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and in the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Restatement calls
confidentiality "a hallmark of professional practice."25 Recognizing
that confidentiality can be exploited to violate the law, it relies on ex-
ceptions to guard against abuse and concludes that "[tihe law is
molded on the premise that a greater good inheres in encouraging all
clients, most of whom incline toward complying with the law, to con-
sult freely with their lawyers under the protection of confidentiality in
order to gain the benefit of frank communication."26
Similarly, comment 2 to Model Rule 1.6 explains that the prohibi-
tion against disclosing information relating to the representation of a
client exists to encourage the client "to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrass-
ing or legally damaging subject matter."2 7 The comment adds that
"[t]he lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively
and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful con-
duct."28 It concludes that, "fa]lmost without exception, clients come to
lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex
of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice
given, and the law is upheld."29
The Supreme Court has offered parallel justifications for both the
client-lawyer privilege and the work product doctrine. In Upjohn Co.
23. See, e.g., KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 39-46, 53-55 (1985);
AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS
4-5 (1995).
24. Zacharias, supra note 21, at 377-88; see also RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 13, at
65.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, introductory note
(2000).
26. Id.





v. United States,30 the Court extended both privileges to corporations,
and reasoned that these evidentiary doctrines were intended to "en-
courage full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice."31 More recently, in declaring that
the privilege extends to posthumous attempts to compel lawyer testi-
mony, the Court relied on a similar rationale, finding that clients will
be encouraged "to communicate fully and frankly with counsel" if they
know that their communications will remain confidential even after
their deaths.32 The Court specifically dismissed concerns that the
lawyer would only be required to disclose that which the client could
have been required to disclose if alive, finding that the "loss of evi-
dence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in part by the fact
that without the privilege, the client may not have made such commu-
nications in the first place."33
With respect to the work product doctrine, the Court initially cre-
ated the evidentiary privilege to protect unnecessary attempts to ob-
tain "written statements, private memoranda and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the
course of his legal duties."34 It did so to encourage lawyers to create
written accounts of their legal analysis and factual work-up of a case
in litigation, thus serving the interest of "clients and the cause of jus-
tice."3 5 Of course, creating legal protection for a lawyer's work in an-
ticipation of litigation also helped prevent demoralization of the
profession by guaranteeing that the opposing party would not be able
to make use of the work.36 The Restatement further explains that the
expanded discovery rules of the past half century "presupposed that
counsel should be able to work within an area of professional confiden-
tiality ... in which opposing lawyers competitively develop their own
sources of factual and legal information."37 This rationale in turn de-
pends on a "companion assumption," that "truth emerges from the ad-
versary presentation of information by opposing sides."38
30. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
31. Id. at 389. Judge Easterbrook characterized the Rehnquist majority opinion as
providing "a thoughtful statement of the value of property rights in information
and the role of confidentiality in allowing people to realize the return from their
investment in information." Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT.
REV. 309, 357.
32. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998).
33. Id. at 408.
34. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
35. Id. at 511.
36. Id.





Deontologists begin their analysis of the good and right by search-
ing for universal rules, principles or duties that obligate us to respect
others.3 9 Morally appropriate conduct is measured by the motive of
the actor, rather than by the consequences the actor produces. Im-
manuel Kant, for example, argued that certain categorical impera-
tives, such as to "treat others only as an end, and never as a means
only," should serve as a template in determining whether conduct is
ethically justifiable.40 Similarly, conduct that violates a categorical
imperative or fundamental right should be considered blameworthy
and subject to sanction.4 1
A deontological justification of the confidentiality obligation might
begin by identifying the purpose of the legal system as the protection
of "the autonomy of the will"42 or individual rights, such as the right
to contract, to own property or to be entitled to due process. These
rights, which respect persons by protecting individual liberty and pro-
moting respect for human autonomy, easily can become vulnerable to
infringement by powerful majoritarian interests of the government or
others. Law and the legal system provide the means to assure that
such infringements are prevented or redressed.43
Lawyers trained to recognize the value of individual rights in turn
invite clients to trust them in securing justice. When a lawyer agrees
to represent a client, she implicitly promises loyalty and confidential-
ity, because this fidelity is essential to any human relationship where
one person seeks to respect and represent the interests of another.44
Confidentiality promotes both the individual rights of citizens and the
trust that is central to a client-lawyer relationship. It is a fundamen-
tal ethical value, part of the implied understanding integral to a trust-
ing relationship.45 Confidentiality is part of the assurance clients
need to guarantee them that their lawyers will respect them as moral
agents and serve their interests rather than serving as extensions of
the public order that judges or shapes their conduct.46
39. See generally W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (Oxford University Press
1967) (1930) (analyzing the meaning of "right" and "good").
40. THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 123 (1982).
41. Professor Ross called these obligations "prima facie duties." Ross, supra note 39,
at 19-21; see also BEAUCHAMP, supra note 40, at 123.
42. Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Agency, 116 LAw Q.
REV. 387, 402 (2000).
43. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.3
(3d ed. 2003).
44. See Ross, supra note 39, at 21.
45. Ross says that the duty to keep promises is a "dut[y] of perfect obligation" to
which we owe "a great deal of stringency." Id. at 41-42.
46. Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value
Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REV. 349, 355 (1981).
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Privacy also promotes the individual rights of citizens by giving
them personal space to plan and define their own meaning in life and
decide when to share their personal secrets. 4 7 The government should
not be able to infringe on that private space when it is used to promote
that individual's autonomous sense of self. A lawyer's obligation not
to share the information further protects the client's own defined
sphere of privacy, which can become especially important when gov-
ernment compulsion through the legal system seeks to invade it.
Such a deontological justification appears as the main basis for the
fiduciary duty of confidentiality found in the law of agency and the
lawyer codes. The protection of individual privacy also justifies the
client-lawyer and work product privileges. The Restatement, for ex-
ample, reminds us that "A client's approach to a lawyer for legal assis-
tance implies that the client trust the lawyer to advance and protect
the interests of the client. The resulting duty of loyalty is the predi-
cate of the duty of confidentiality."48 Justice Story spoke of the "confi-
dence necessarily reposed in the agent, that he will act with a sole
regard to the interests of his principal, as far as he lawfully may" as
part of the initial bargain with the agent that included "the exercise of
the disinterested skill, diligence, and zeal of the agent" for the princi-
pal's exclusive benefit. 4 9
Similarly, comment 2 to Model Rule 1.6 describes the confidential-
ity obligation not to "reveal information relating to the representa-
tion" as a "fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship"
because it "contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-
lawyer relationship."50 Professor Monroe Freedman adds that "fidel-
ity to that trust is 'the glory of our profession."' 5 1 All of these justifica-
tions depend on the fact that once the lawyer agrees to represent a
client, the lawyer has promised fiduciary duties essential to the
relationship. 52
Deontological reasoning less commonly is seen as a justification for
the attorney-client and work product privileges, but occasionally is in-
voked there as well. The Restatement, for example, acknowledges that
the privilege can impair the search for the truth, but concludes that,
47. See SIssELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 120
(1982).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. b (2000).
49. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 240 (Charles P. Green-
ough ed., 9th ed. 1882).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2002).
51. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 127 n.4 (quoting United States v. Costen,
38 Fed. 24 (1889) (upholding the disbarment of a lawyer who ceased representing
a client in pending litigation, and then sought employment with opposing counsel
by offering to disclose "facts of great importance" to the other side)).
52. Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confiden-
tiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 446 (1990).
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overall, legal recognition of the privilege "reflects a judgment that this
impairment is outweighed by the social and moral values of confiden-
tial consultations. The privilege provides a zone of privacy within
which a client may more effectively exercise the full autonomy that
the law and legal institutions allow."53 Work-product immunity simi-
larly "seeks to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can work
free from intrusion by opposing counsel."5 4
III. DEFENDING THE EXCEPTIONS
Exceptions to confidentiality have coexisted with the obligation
since its inception. If the rationales that support the obligation of con-
fidentiality in the first place make sense, then the same policies
should justify exceptions to lawyer obligations of client confidentiality.
In other words, if preserving confidentiality promotes efficient func-
tioning of the legal system, an exception can be justified to restore or
promote effective operation of the system of justice. Similarly, if pre-
serving client confidences is deemed important to promote trust or pri-
vacy in the client-lawyer relationship, an exception can be justified
where preserving client confidences actually operates to breach a trust
or foster misuse of the relationship to violate legal norms.
It is important to note that most of the exceptions recognized by
the Restatement and the Model Rules are discretionary, not
mandatory. That is, they allow, but do not require disclosure of client
confidential information, and they allow disclosure only to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the competing
goal embodied in the exception.5 5 In the case of the client-lawyer priv-
ilege and work product immunity, the Restatement requires the law-
yer to invoke the privilege or immunity unless the client has
authorized the lawyer to waive it, and places the burden of proof on
the person seeking the information to demonstrate each element of an
applicable exception.5 6
The recognition of discretion but not mandate indicates that the
central purpose of client confidentiality should not be overcome for
trivial reasons. Further, even when a competing interest creates an
exception, confidentiality should be breached only to the extent neces-
sary to accommodate the competing policy. Of course, it is possible to
argue that the strength of an exception compels disclosure. For exam-
ple, most jurisdictions agree that client frauds on tribunals require
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, introductory note
to topic 3 (2000).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 61-67 (2000).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (2000).
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lawyer disclosure if necessary to remedy the harm. 57 Similarly, exter-
nal legal requirements, such as court orders, may compel disclosure.5 8
Even then, however, relevant rules require that lawyers raise applica-
ble privileges and disclose protected information only to the extent
reasonably necessary to accomplish the competing purpose.
A. Client Consent, Express or Implied
The most widely recognized exception to client confidentiality, and
the easiest exception to justify, occurs when clients decide for them-
selves whether to allow the use or disclosure of such information.
Even here, however, wide latitude exists for lawyers to define or abuse
discretion in advising or taking for granted what clients wish to do.
In utilitarian terms, the legal system needs specific facts to func-
tion; therefore, clients who wish to take advantage of the system's pro-
tections or allowances must agree, as a condition of using the system,
to supply the legal system with some information. When the client
explicitly consents to the disclosure of certain facts, the client presum-
ably has made her own utilitarian calculation about the balance of
benefit and burden in disclosing the information.
An interesting example is People v. Gonnella,59 where a criminal
defendant told his lawyer to see to it that the lawyer for his co-defen-
dant was removed from the case, and intimated that if the co-defen-
dant's lawyer did not end the representation, he would be killed. The
lawyer told his boss, who informed the prosecutor. When the prosecu-
tor sought the original lawyer's testimony before a grand jury, the
court held that the privilege had never attached because the client
intended the information to be divulged. The court therefore denied
the motion to quash the subpoena, but nevertheless cautioned the
prosecutor to limit the scope of the examination to information the
client intended to disclose; that is, threats against co-counsel.
Beyond explicit consent, however, the law has recognized that cli-
ents implicitly consent in situations such as discovery where the legal
system's rules require the information to function. Comments to the
Model Rules assign implicit authority to lawyers in most of these cir-
cumstances, such as admitting a fact that cannot properly be dis-
puted.6 0 Of course, these rules are far less clear outside of litigation,
in situations such as negotiation or various forms of alternative dis-
pute resolution where disclosure of facts commonly occurs without ex-
plicit client consent. Even here, except where the client has given
57. See, e.g., id. § 120; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). But see NEB.
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1996).
58. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2002); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63 (2000).
59. 570 A.2d 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) cmt. 5 (2002).
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specific instructions to the contrary, or "special circumstances limit
that authority, a lawyer is implicitly authorized to disclose client con-
fidences when appropriate in carrying out the representation."61
The Restatement clarifies the circumstances where such a disclo-
sure might be appropriate, by requiring that lawyers not use or dis-
close clients' confidential information "if there is a reasonable prospect
that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the client."62
In other words, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to disclose "when the
lawyer reasonably believes that doing so will advance the interests of
the client in the representation."6 3 The comments to this section are
explicitly utilitarian, instructing the lawyer to make a "reasonable cal-
culation of advantage to a client," including consideration of whether a
disclosure acts to waive the attorney-client privilege.64 As the risk in-
creases that any disclosure may have a negative impact on the client
or the client's matter, the lawyer should check her own judgment with
that of the client. This explains why both the Model Rules and the
Restatement make all of the implied authority of the lawyer ultimately
subject to the client's own definition of the client's best interests.
Deontologists agree that client consent makes sense as an excep-
tion to confidentiality, but for different reasons. They view consent as
the client's autonomous authorization to disclosure or use of the infor-
mation.65 Agency law rests on such a consensual foundation and pro-
tects extensions of autonomy by granting individuals the opportunity
to act through others. 66 This rationale can be seen in Model Rule 1.4,
which generally requires lawyers to communicate with clients, and in
Model Rule 1.6, which requires that clients give "informed consent" to
disclosures of confidential information.6 7 "Informed consent" means
that the client has agreed to a "proposed course of action after the
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation
about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to
the proposed course of conduct."68
Although this principle seems obvious, two cases illustrate that
lawyers are not always aware of the proper scope of this exception.
For example, in Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan,69 the lawyers were retained
by an insurer to represent a Coca-Cola bottler concerning a serious
accident involving one of their trucks, which hit a school bus killing
61. Id.
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(1)(a) (2000).
63. Id. § 61.
64. Id. § 61 cmt. d.
65. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 307, 311-312 (1980).
66. See McMeel, supra note 42, at 402.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002).
68. Id. R. 1.0(e).
69. 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
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twenty-one children. The lawyers visited the bus driver in the hospi-
tal, told him they were "his lawyers too," and took a statement from
him. The driver admitted he had not checked the brakes that morning
and did not have enough time to apply the emergency brakes. Upon
receiving this potentially inculpatory information, the lawyers, proba-
bly sensing a conflict of interest, withdrew and assigned new counsel
to Mr. Perez. Then, in an attempt to cooperate with the district attor-
ney's office, and without notifying Mr. Perez's new lawyer, they turned
over his statement to the prosecutor, who promptly indicted Mr. Perez
for twenty-one counts of involuntary manslaughter. Mr. Perez even-
tually was tried and acquitted three and one-half years later, after
suffering a great deal of emotional distress in addition to a serious
brain injury from the crash. Ultimately, his employer was faulted for
failing to properly maintain the truck's brakes.70
A Texas appellate court upheld Mr. Perez's claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty, including his damages for mental anguish. It emphasized
the fiduciary nature of the client-lawyer relationship, "one which re-
quires absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the ab-
sence of any concealment or deception."7 1 Neither the lawyers' desire
to cooperate with officials nor the threat of subpoena justified their
disclosure of Mr. Perez's statement without his consent. In fact, Mr.
Perez's new lawyer opined that, had he known about release of the
statement, he could have had Mr. Perez explain his lack of training to
the grand jury, and Mr. Perez would not have been indicted.
The same principle of client autonomy is illustrated by In re
Pressly,7 2 where a divorce client who suspected her husband of abus-
ing their nine-year-old daughter instructed her lawyer not to discuss
her suspicions with her husband's lawyer. When opposing counsel
pressed the wife's lawyer to explain why the wife continued to request
supervised visitations, he decided it "would be best" to reveal his cli-
ent's suspicions. When the opposing lawyer told the husband, and the
husband confronted the wife, she fired the lawyer and filed a griev-
ance. Although the disclosure ultimately had no adverse impact on
the pending litigation, the Vermont Supreme Court found that the
lawyer's belief that the disclosure was best constituted no defense to
the reality that he had "violated a core component of the attorney-
client relationship."73
70. See also Truck Driver Settles Suit from Crash that Killed 21 Schoolchildren in
'89, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 1994, at 29A. The bottler eventually paid
over $133 million in settlements to the families of the injured and dead children
including $462,619 to Mr. Perez for his injuries. See A Tragedy Remembered,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21, 1999, at 17A.
71. Perez, 822 S.W.2d at 265.




In both Perez and Pressly, the lawyers disclosed confidential infor-
mation of a client because they deemed it best to do so. In Perez, they
failed to ask their client for consent, despite the obvious inculpatory
nature of the client's statement. In Pressly, the lawyer thought he
knew better than the client even when confronted with an explicit cli-
ent mandate not to disclose sensitive information. Both of these situa-
tions are far distant from those where consent properly could be
implied as a true expression of the client's autonomous desire, or from
a reasonable calculation of the client's advantage.
An interesting application of the correct rationale for implied con-
sent appears in recently revised Model Rule 1.14 concerning clients
with diminished capacity. A lawyer's reasonable belief that a client,
because of diminished capacity, would suffer substantial physical, fi-
nancial, or other harm may take reasonable protective action if the
client is not able to do so. Further, the lawyer is impliedly authorized
to reveal confidential information in order to protect the client's inter-
ests. The comment explains that in taking protective action, "the law-
yer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the
client, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the
client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maxi-
mizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social
connections." 74 In other words, if the client were capable, she would
recognize her interests and consent to the disclosure.75 Consider for
example, how such a rule might apply to a client who expresses sui-
cidal wishes.
I recently responded to an inquiry from a lawyer who told me that
his client was a "poster child for physician assisted suicide." When I
asked why, the lawyer said that the client was suffering from cancer
and had often talked about her right to die. I asked him what stage
the cancer was in and whether she might be depressed. He said that
her cancer was in remission and that she had a history of depression.
I told him I thought he should evaluate whether her expressed desire
to die was in fact a plea for help. He went further, asking her whether
she thought she needed a psychological evaluation. She checked her-
self into the hospital that night. This consultation indicates the way
the rule should work. Clients, like the rest of us, do not always say
exactly what we mean. This client was not suffering from cancer, but
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Neb. Bar Ass'n, Advisory Comm. Op. 91-4, [Ethics Opinions 1991-1995]
LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 1001:5501 (Nov. 17, 1993) (noting that
a lawyer who reasonably believes a client to be mentally incompetent may dis-
close confidential communications to the extent necessary to protect the best in-
terests of the client).
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from depression. Once someone cared enough to ask her about it, she
got the treatment she wanted. 76
B. Physical Harm
In addition to raising questions about the client's true intent, a cli-
ent's suicide threat also presents a dramatic clash between client con-
fidentiality and the compelling need to prevent serious physical harm.
The same conflict occurs in situations where the client confides a
threat of serious physical harm to another.
The utilitarian would begin by returning to the basic principle that
we want to encourage citizens to bring their problems, antagonisms,
and resentments to lawyers who will channel them into peaceful solu-
tions. Lawyers guarantee confidentiality, in part, to encourage clients
to blow off steam, which affords lawyers an opportunity to counsel
them to abstain from vigilante justice. Occasionally, this goal fails,
either because the lawyer cannot talk the client out of dangerous be-
havior, or because the client describes the behavior of someone with
whom the lawyer has no relationship. In that situation, the lawyer is
justified in disclosing client confidences to promote the greater good of
preserving human life and preventing injurious behavior. The client
has, in the words of John Stuart Mill, exceeded "the rightful limit to
the sovereignty of the individual over himself."77 Further, the situa-
tions in which a lawyer might act to prevent this kind of harm are so
few that creating such an exception does little to destroy the utility of
confidentiality in encouraging clients to speak.78
The comments to both the Model Rules and the Restatement reflect
this utilitarian rationale, indicating that this exception "recognizes
the overriding value of life and physical integrity."79 This view, that
the value of human life should allow lawyers discretion to disclose cli-
ent confidences, both expands and contracts the current future crime
provisions now in place in a majority of jurisdictions.8 0 On the one
hand, the new provision allows disclosure where the act threatening
serious bodily harm or death is not criminal, or not the act of a client.
On the other, it does not allow disclosure for threatened client crimes
that do not pose such a threat, because the competing value of serious
physical harm is not present to justify disclosure. The legal classifica-
76. The few cases that have addressed this issue have allowed lawyers wide latitude
in deciding whether or not to disclose. See, e.g., People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d
485 (County Ct. 1980); Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979).
77. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75 (1947).
78. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 145.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 66 cmt. b (2000).
80. See, e.g., NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1998).
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tion of the client's conduct is replaced by the seriousness of the threat
to the health and safety of others. 8 1 The example offered in the Model
Rules comment indicates this clear intent. Thus, a lawyer who learns
that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into the city
water supply may reveal such a risk to authorities, regardless of the
legal characterization of the discharge, as long as there is a "present
and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract
a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is
necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims." 82
One example of a court's reliance on this utilitarian justification
occurred in Purcell v. District Attorney,8 3 where a legal services law-
yer conferred with a client about his recent discharge as a mainte-
nance man at an apartment building and his impending eviction
because he no longer worked for the management company. During
the course of the conversation, the lawyer learned that the client in-
tended to burn the building, and later told a Boston police lieutenant
that his client had made such threats. The police arrested the client
the next day, just after smoke detectors had been disarmed and gaso-
line had been poured on the hallway floor. They later sought the law-
yer's testimony against the client in his trial for attempted arson.
The court first noted the ethical propriety of the lawyer's disclo-
sure. It then turned to the issue of whether the crime-fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege should justify the lawyer's testimony in
the subsequent criminal trial. The court said "no," because the client
did not consult the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining advice to fur-
ther the crime, but rather for the purpose of learning about his legal
rights with respect to employment and eviction. The court cautioned
against permitting the use of client threats of harm to a lawyer to be
used against the client in a subsequent trial, because "lawyers will be
reluctant to come forward if they know that the information that they
disclose may lead to adverse consequences to their clients."84 Such a
practice also "might prompt a lawyer to warn a client in advance that
the disclosure of certain information may not be held confidential,
thereby chilling free discourse between lawyer and a client and reduc-
ing the prospect that the lawyer will learn of a serious threat to the
well-being of others."8 5
81. Cf Neb. Bar Ass'n, Advisory Comm. Op. 93-4, [Ethics Opinions 1991-1995] LAw.
MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 1001:5502 (Nov. 17, 1993) (stating that a
lawyer whose prospective client disclosed intent to commit a future crime may
disclose client's intention and should consider likelihood that client will complete
his plan and the harmful effects of the plan on others).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2002).
83. 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997).




In other words, we want lawyers to learn facts that might provide
them with the opportunity to prevent serious harm to others. Purcell
did the right thing by disclosing, and similar actions by other lawyers
should not be deterred by exceptions to the privilege, except where the
client's only intent is to use the lawyer's services to harm others.
Focusing on duties required by the client-lawyer relationship
yields a similar answer. The deontologist would agree that clients
should be encouraged to blow off steam in a safe, trusting, private re-
lationship, where the chances of assisting the client to discover his
own best self may be optimal. On the other hand, a client like Pur-
cell's, who expresses his desire to harm someone else, does not deserve
the respect promoted by the professional obligation of confidentiality
because the client herself proposes to violate a categorical imperative
designed to promote human flourishing.8 6 The autonomy we grant to
protect private secrets does not extend to acts of violence against
others or to make lawyers complicitous in such acts.8 7 "The value at
stake, human life, is of unique importance."88
The newly articulated scope and reason for this exception also pro-
vide a better basis for understanding a classic case in professional re-
sponsibility, Spaulding v. Zimmerman.8 9 There, a physician hired by
an insurance company to examine a teenage boy injured in a car acci-
dent discovered a life threatening aneurysm in the boy, which had not
been diagnosed by three of the boy's own doctors. The insurer, reason-
ing that the boy's lawyers did not request the medical report through
discovery procedures, and that the existence of the aneurysm might
inflate the value of the case, did not disclose the problem either to the
boy or his parents before the case settled. When the aneurysm was
diagnosed and treated with immediate surgery by another physician a
few years later, the boy, now a young man in his twenties, sought to
reopen the tort judgment. The court allowed a Rule 60(b) motion to
reopen the settlement, but only because the plaintiff had been a minor
at the time of the settlement.
Of course, under both revised Model Rule 1.6 and the Restatement,
a lawyer for the insurer in Spaulding would have discretion to disclose
this fact in order to prevent the boy's death.90 To further encourage
such disclosures, the Restatement provides that the lawyer first seek
to persuade the client to act appropriately, and then advise the client
86. Ross says that those who violate the rights of others have lost their own prima
facie rights to life, liberty, or property "in so far as these rested on an explicit or
implicit undertaking to respect the corresponding rights in others." Ross, supra
note 39, at 62.
87. BOK, supra note 47, at 129.
88. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 145.
89. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 66 (2000).
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of the lawyer's ability to disclose to prevent the harm.9 1 Even then,
the exception is entirely discretionary. The lawyer is neither subject
to discipline nor civilly liable to the third party for choosing to disclose
or deciding to remain silent.92
C. Financial Harm
Exceptions to client confidentiality that countenance disclosure to
prevent, rectify, or mitigate financial harm caused by a client have
created the most disagreement among lawyers and the public. Yet,
perhaps because human greed is such a pervasive phenomenon, confi-
dentiality exceptions have long been recognized when clients seek to
use lawyers to promote fraudulent activity.9 3
Utilitarians recognize that efficient operation of both a market
economy and a democratic government requires honesty. Mill argued
that "[a]s soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially
the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it." In other
words, liars can be characterized as "free riders" who unjustly seek
their own financial gain by cheating on the basic functioning of the
economic and governmental systems and by taking advantage of the
91. Amazingly, the lawyers in Spaulding failed to ask their client, Zimmerman, in
whose car Spaulding was riding and who had a personal relationship with
Spaulding's family, whether he would consent to the disclosure. This is undoubt-
edly because they incorrectly viewed themselves primarily as insurance company
lawyers rather than Zimmerman's lawyer. Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles,
Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83
MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 66(2), (3) (2000).
Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), is the only case to
consider whether a lawyer owes some duty to a third party to act. The court
refused to extend a duty to warn third persons who already knew that the client
was dangerous, concluding that "unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt
that the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious personal injuries on
an unknowing third person," the lawyer has no duty to warn. Id. at 365.
It is also interesting to consider the physician's duty in Spaulding. In a re-
markably similar case nearly thirty years later, a Minnesota appeals court con-
cluded that a physician hired by an insurance carrier to determine workers'
compensation benefits owed no duty to diagnose or disclose the presence of an
aneurysm to the person he examined. Henkemeyer v. Boxall, 465 N.W.2d 437
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
Thankfully, a number of more recent cases depart from such a narrow view of
the physician-patient relationship. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530
(Colo. 1993); Webb v. T.D., 951 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1997); Ranier v. Frieman, 682
A.2d 1220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
93. E.g., Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979) (recognizing the
crime-fraud exception, in what is now NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503(4) (Reissue 1995),
to the lawyer-client privilege if "the services are sought or obtained to enable or
aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew, or reasonably
should have know, to be a fraud.").
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honesty of others.9 4 If everyone could use lawyers to promote their
own illegal deception, the market system, many aspects of govern-
ment, and certainly the legal system would lose the confidence of the
citizenry.9 5 To prevent this overall erosion in confidence, lawyers
should be able to disclose activities of clients who seek to use the law-
yer's services to perpetrate a fraud.
Focusing on trust and privacy, the deontologist would start from
the premise that the professional guarantee of confidentiality was in-
tended to promote trust so as to assist the client in straightening out a
mess or in planning for lawful economic or other activity. When the
client seeks to use the relationship and the duties implicit in the rela-
tionship to create a legal mess by violating another categorical imper-
ative such as honesty, the client's right to confidence has been lost.
Misusing a trusting relationship to cause harm to others forfeits the
client's right to trust or privacy. 96 If the lawyer's services have been
used to further that fraud, the lawyer's duty of reparation for her own
acts also comes into play.9 7
Both of these justifications are articulated in the Restatement's em-
brace of a discretionary exception to client confidentiality to prevent,
mitigate, or rectify a client's crime or fraud that "threatens substan-
tial financial loss,"9 8 and in its articulation of the crime-fraud excep-
tion to the client-lawyer privilege. 99 The exception to the privilege is
justified by both the "public interest in preventing clients from at-
tempting to misuse the client-lawyer relationship for seriously harm-
ful ends," a utilitarian rationale, and the fact that such a "client's
wrongful act forfeits the protection," a deontological reason.
The Restatement also justifies a discretionary exception to the gen-
eral obligation of confidentiality by the need to protect the interests of
society and third persons in avoiding substantial financial loss, and to
protect the integrity, professional reputation, and financial interests
of the lawyer, all competing utilitarian rationales. 100 The same excep-
tion is justified by a deontological rationale; that "the client is not enti-
tled to the protection of confidentiality when the client knowingly
causes substantial financial harm through a crime or fraud . . .and
the client has in effect misused the client-lawyer relationship for that
purpose."101 Once again, the lawyer should counsel the client to de-
94. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 23 (2d ed. 1999).
95. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 66 (2000).
96. Moore, supra note 9, at 225.
97. Ross, supra note 39, at 21; see also supra note 86.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000).





sist or remedy the fraud, and warn the client about the lawyer's dis-
cretion to disclose before doing so. 10 2
An example of reliance on these rationales can be found in United
States v. Chen,l03 where a law firm was hired to bring a client into
compliance with customs laws. Completely unknown to the lawyers,
the clients in fact used their lawyers' services to make false state-
ments to the Customs Service in order to shield their preexisting tax
evasion scheme. In considering whether the government could use the
lawyer's testimony in a subsequent criminal action against the clients
for tax evasion and conspiracy, the court began by noting that "much
of what lawyers actually do for a living consists of helping their clients
comply with the law."1 0 4 Further, "this valuable social service... can-
not be performed effectively if clients are scared to tell their lawyers
what they are doing, for fear that their lawyers will be turned into
government informants." 10 5 On the other hand, a client may act in
such a way as to forfeit the benefits of confidentiality. Since the privi-
lege was the client's, the court held that the "client's misconduct suf-
ficed to lose it, despite the lawyers' innocence of wrongdoing." 10 6
The question of whether a lawyer should be able to disclose a cli-
ent's fraud has been the subject of unrelenting debate for over a quar-
ter century. Original drafts of the Model Rules in 1980 included a
provision that would have permitted a lawyer to disclose information
both to prevent and to rectify criminal or fraudulent acts of clients on
both tribunals and third persons. These proposals prevailed where
the fraud was perpetrated on a tribunal (Model Rule 3.3), but failed
where the fraud occurred outside of tribunals (Model Rule 4.1). As a
compromise, the so-called "noisy withdrawal" concept was added in
comment 16 to Model Rule 1.6. This comment provides that a lawyer
who withdraws to avoid assisting or counseling a client's crime or
fraud may "give notice of the fact of withdrawal . . .and may also
withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like."
The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended similar discretionary
exceptions to the ABA House of Delegates. Once again, the House was
willing to retain the long-standing exception for public frauds on
courts, but rejected any such exception for private frauds on third par-
ties. As a result, the noisy withdrawal comment remains in Model
Rule 1.6. Enron and the ABA's Task Force on Corporate Responsibil-
102. See also Pizzimenti, supra note 52.
103. 99 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1996).
104. Id. at 1500 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
105. Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
106. Id. at 1504.
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ity have once again raised this question, and the Task Force seems
likely to ask the House of Delegates to rethink it.107
As jurisdictions consider their own versions of the revised Model
Rules, debate over these provisions will once again intensify. Today,
jurisdictions disagree strongly on the lawyer's obligations outside of
tribunals when the client contemplates or commits fraud. If the cli-
ent's conduct is contemplated (future) and criminal, forty-one states,
including Nebraska, allow or require disclosure. If the contemplated
fraud is not criminal, roughly ten jurisdictions allow disclosure. Indi-
vidual jurisdictions also differ about the lawyer's ability to disclose for
the purpose of rectifying the consequences of past fraud committed by
clients using the lawyer's services. Here, where the client's crime or
fraud is ongoing, over forty jurisdictions allow or require disclosure.
However, if the fraud is past, that is, has already been completed,
fewer than twenty jurisdictions allow disclosure of fraudulent activity
outside of a tribunal.108
Lawyers and jurisdictions that oppose exceptions to confidentiality
designed to allow lawyers to warn about or rectify client fraud usually
rely on utilitarian arguments. First, they maintain that narrower ex-
ceptions to confidentiality in general create more opportunity for law-
yers to encourage full and frank communication with clients and,
therefore, enhance the ability of lawyers to give legal advice to avoid
or mitigate wrongful conduct. Second, they argue that "fraud" is al-
ways difficult to identify at the time it occurs, and easier to recognize
after the fact,109 and they worry that adding such an exception might
be construed as a duty to warn in a later civil case. Any exception to
confidentiality tied to client fraud therefore increases the likelihood
that liability will be extended to lawyers who did not warn or rectify.
This in turn will force lawyers to practice law defensively, erring on
the side of disclosure and undermining client trust. Third, they main-
tain that exceptions to save human life recognize a competing value of
"unique importance," where no remedy will suffice to prevent the
harm.110 Client fraud, on the other hand, usually results in monetary
107. Rule on Reporting Wrongs Stirs Debate, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Sept. 27, 2002. For a
case that discusses the various liability theories against Enron and its profes-
sional advisors, see, In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation,
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
108. E. Norman Veasey, The Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer
for the Corporation in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or
Agents, 70 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); see also NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1996).
109. This problem is compounded by the problem of "hindsight bias," a cognitive dis-
tortion that causes humans to believe that because a past event (like fraud) has
occurred, it must have meant the event could have been anticipated in advance.
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind-
sight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
110. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 145.
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loss, which can be restored by other legal remedies. Finally, lawyers
who oppose client fraud exceptions argue that when client fraud does
occur, the lawyer's withdrawal from the matter is sufficient to extri-
cate the lawyer from the client's wrongdoing.",1
Lawyers and jurisdictions that support exceptions to confidential-
ity where client fraud occurs or is threatened address the same issues,
but disagree on the result, and are more apt to rely on deontological
thinking. Some concede the possibility that some clients might be less
willing to confide in lawyers, but maintain that clients who misuse the
client-lawyer relationship are not entitled to absolute confidential-
ity.112 Others point out that clients will not fail to confide in lawyers
because the "complexity of many transactions requires full disclosure
to attorneys regardless of confidentiality." 113 Further, they argue
that the ability of lawyers to encourage clients to act lawfully will be
enhanced by a discretionary disclosure provision. With respect to the
threat of civil liability, they note that civil liability already exists in
many cases. 114 To clarify this point, they cite section 67(4) of the Re-
statement, which provides that any exercise of discretion under this
exception does not create grounds for discipline or liability. Finally,
lawyers caught in the web of client wrongdoing argue that an excep-
tion to confidentiality where the client perpetrates a fraud by using
the lawyer's services actually allows lawyers to extricate themselves
from the client's acts before they otherwise might be able to respond
under the self-defense exception in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2). Disclosing
111. ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 48-49 (1987).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 cmt. b (2000). Pro-
fessor Burt argues that the mistrust which pervades the client-lawyer relation-
ship might actually be addressed and alleviated by more discretionary disclosure
exceptions because they would force honest exploration of the basis for the mis-
trust. Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO.
L.J. 1015 (1981).
113. Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in Justifying
Some Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49, 84
(2001).
114. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424
(D. Ariz. 1992) (upholding causes of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, RICO, and state blue sky laws as well as common law fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty actions against the Jones Day law firm that assisted
Lincoln Savings and Loan in "hiding loan file deficiencies from regulators, offered
detailed advice about setting up the bond sales program... and lent its name to a
misleading legal opinion"). The firm eventually settled the public and private
claims for $75 million. Henry J. Reske, Firm Agrees to Record S&L Settlement:
Shifting Standards Require Lawyers to Disclose More to Regulatory Agencies,
A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 16. The law firm that represented Lincoln Savings and
Loan on regulatory matters after Jones Day-Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Nays &
Handler-also settled with both private investors ($21 million) and the govern-
ment ($41 million). Stephen Labaton, Law Firm Will Pay a $41 Million Fine in
Savings Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al.
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client misconduct when they withdraw from the representation also
avoids the fiction of limited disclosure by notification and disavowal
allowed by the "noisy withdrawal" compromise.
In response to these arguments, the revised Model Rules currently
require disclosure of frauds on tribunals, but apparently not frauds on
third parties.'1 5 Where the fraud occurs in a public forum and the
participants have the most incentive apart from professional rules to
ferret it out, the rules require disclosure. On the other hand, where
the fraud occurs in private and may harm entirely unrepresented per-
sons, the lawyer should not have a duty to keep quiet, especially when
a client with the worst intent has lied to his own lawyer in order to
obtain the legal services that perpetrated the fraud. The Restatement
and Ethics 2000 Commission recognized that when a client has mis-
used the relationship and threatens serious financial harm to others,
an exception to confidentiality makes sense, both on utilitarian and
deontological grounds. The crime-fraud exception to the privilege rec-
ognizes this, and the law governing lawyers, including the lawyer
codes should as well.
D. Seeking Advice
In a growing number of situations, lawyers themselves seek advice
from other professionals about how to comply with the lawyer codes or
other aspects of the law governing lawyers. In some of these circum-
stances, the lawyer may not know about or understand a professional
rule or fiduciary duty that clearly dictates a course of action. In
others, the lawyer may, by dint of study or intuition, understand tle
basics but need advice because of a lack of clarity about how to proceed
when two duties, such as the duty of candor to a court and a duty of
confidentiality to a client, collide. Although in many of these cases a
lawyer can protect a client's confidences by disguising the facts with a
hypothetical situation, in others the advisor will need a more detailed
disclosure of the facts to offer helpful and accurate advice. 116
A utilitarian would justify this exception by returning to the con-
clusion that the legal system depends on lawyers and their fiduciary
duties to promote the greatest good for the greatest number, which
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (Candor Toward the Tribu-
nal); id. R. 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others). Rule 4.1, unlike Rule 3.3,
limits its disclosure requirements to explicit exceptions found in Rule 1.6. Al-
though explicit exceptions based on client crimes or frauds that threaten severe
financial harm have been rejected by the ABA, Rule 1.6(b)(4) does recognize a
discretionary exception to client confidentiality "to comply with other law." Id. R.
1.6(b)(4). Insofar as "law" includes the law of fraud, this exception can be read to
justify disclosures to prevent a lawyer from assisting a client fraud under Rule
4.1(b). See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 43, § 9.27.
116. See Drew G. Kershen, The Ethics of Ethics Consultation, PROF. LAw., May 1995,
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translates into a stable and fair legal system and society. Therefore,
even if some unfortunate consequence were to occur if one lawyer were
to disclose client confidences in order to get advice about these obliga-
tions, overall, the system, which depends on lawyers, will work better
if lawyers are encouraged to seek such assistance. The Model Rules
reflect this kind of thinking when they say that such disclosure is per-
mitted because of "the importance of the lawyer's compliance with the
Rules of Professional Conduct."117
A deontologist would remind us that lawyers, like clients, are
moral persons whose need for guidance about how to act ethically
should be respected. In situations where the client seeks to use the
lawyer or the legal system for some unlawful purpose, the lawyer
should be able to clarify the circumstance in her own mind, in order to
determine whether to continue advocacy of the client's interests. Fur-
ther, in many situations this advice will be sought so that the lawyer
can better serve the client by keeping confidences or avoiding conflicts
of interest. To that extent, the lawyer's self-interest or expression of
personal autonomy serves the client's interest. To the extent the law-
yer seeks advice to learn more about the appropriate limits to advo-
cacy, the client's interest may not be served. But when this occurs, the
client may be threatening harm to a third party that either the lawyer
should advise against, or, at a minimum, stay out of. Seeking advice
may help either the client or the lawyer to realize his better self. If
the client and lawyer's interests conflict, the lawyer should be able to
learn about the scope of autonomous discretion or mandated duty she
or the client may have.
E. Self Defense
When a lawyer is accused of wrongdoing in the course of represent-
ing a client, whether by a client, former client, or a third person, the
law governing lawyers commonly recognizes an exception for lawyer
self defense.118 It also allows lawyers affirmatively to make a claim
against a client, such as a claim for unpaid legal fees.11 9 Although
relatively uncontroversial, this exception in fact creates the possibility
for mischief if improperly justified or extended too far.
Utilitarians return to the notion that when an accusation of mis-
conduct against a lawyer has occurred, the legal system needs accu-
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7 (2002).
118. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000) (Us-
ing or Disclosing Information in a Lawyer's Self-Defense); id. § 83 (Lawyer Self-
Protection Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege); see also NEB. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1998).
119. See also Crews v. Buckman Labs Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002) (uphold-




rate information to produce just outcomes. Lawyers, therefore, should
be free to disclose information necessary to defend themselves in this
circumstance. Making an affirmative claim for fees also can be justi-
fied on utilitarian grounds, but only if the client has violated a legal
obligation that should be redressed in order to promote the general
availability of lawyers to future clients. On the other hand, lawyers
often are in a better position than clients to protect their own financial
interests (such as by requiring retainers) and therefore should not be
allowed to use such an exception as a "sanction for blackmail."120
The deontologist would defend the lawyer's right to respond to an
accusation on the ground that the lawyer deserves a chance to explain
her conduct, especially when unjustly accused. Similarly, the lawyer
who has provided legal services to a client deserves to be paid for those
services because the client has promised to do so and promises must
be kept. Or, as the comment to Model Rule 1.6 puts it, "the benefici-
ary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of
the fiduciary." 12 1
Both of these justifications can be found in Meyerhofer v. Empire
Fire and Marine,12 2 the classic case on point. There, a lawyer who
tried to prevent his former law firm from assisting a client in securi-
ties fraud was named later as a defendant in a four million-dollar
class action fraud suit by investors. To prove his innocence, the lawyer
gave the plaintiffs a thirty-page affidavit he had authored about the
matter three months earlier when he left the law firm. The affidavit
provided detailed information to the plaintiffs' lawyers about the man-
ner by which the fraud had occurred. The court justified the extent of
the lawyer's disclosure on two utilitarian grounds: it was the "most
effective way for him to substantiate his story" and the "cost of simply
defending such an action might be very substantial."12 3 It also re-
ferred to the potential for damage to the lawyer's reputation during
the pendency of such a suit, and concluded that the lawyer had a right
to defend himself by supporting his version of the facts with suitable
evidence. 124
It is important to recognize that, like other exceptions to confiden-
tiality, this self-defense exception is justified only to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to serve the legitimate purpose for which it was
crafted. For example, threatening to disclose confidential information
to the INS unless a fee is paid takes advantage of the exception, espe-
cially when the client reasonably assumed the service was pro
120. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 148.
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 9 (2002).
122. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974).




bono.125 Similarly, many jurisdictions have changed their minds
about submitting bills to an insurance company's outside auditor for
review. While early ethics opinions seemed to equate such a practice
with the lawyer suing a client for a fee, later opinions recognized that
the detailed information required for documentation of fees violated
client confidences unless client consent is given.126 Yet, seeking such
consent creates a situation where "it is almost inconceivable that it
would ever be in the client's best interests to disclose confidences and
secrets to a third party."127
F. Other Law
Legal obligations such as court orders, statutes, or procedural rules
often require the disclosure of clients' confidential information.128
Creating an exception to client confidentiality when other law re-
quires or allows such disclosure promotes the policy of that other law.
At the same time, allowing other legal obligations to trump lawyer-
client confidentiality may compromise a central justification for confi-
dentiality, especially if the purpose of the other law does not mirror
one of the five exceptions already justified by the underlying ratio-
nales for the protection.
Utilitarians may argue about the precise line to draw in creating
an efficient and fair legal system, but they probably would agree that
court orders and procedural rules should be obeyed in order to pro-
mote the proper functioning of the courts.129 Some statutes, such as
child and elder abuse disclosure provisions, also could justify disclo-
sure if their purpose is to protect child welfare and prevent serious
harm. Similar arguments could be made about the law of fraud. Inso-
far as it prevents unfair use of the market or the legal system and
prevents serious financial loss, a lawyer could be justified to disclose
125. E.g., Counsel for Discipline v. Wilson, 262 Neb. 653, 634 N.W.2d 467 (2001) (re-
sulting in lawyer suspended from practice for two years for threatening to dis-
close confidential information to INS and reopen client's divorce unless alleged
fee, created after client began a relationship with lawyer's estranged wife, was
paid).
126. See, e.g., In re Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000).
127. E.g., Neb. Bar Ass'n, Advisory Comm. Op. 2000-1, [Ethics Opinions 1996-20001
LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 1001:5501 (Dec. 1993) (advising that a
lawyer may not submit a bill to an insurance company for representing insureds
if such bill will be submitted to an outside auditor for review if the bill contains
confidences and secrets of the client).
128. See, e.g., NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1998).
129. E.g., State v. Hawes, 251 Neb. 287, 556 N.W.2d 634 (1996) (holding that lawyer's
communication to client about time, date, and place of scheduled trial was not
privileged and was subject to a subpoena under DR 4-101(C)(2) because disclo-
sure was required by law or court order; however, prosecutor must demonstrate a
compelling need for such evidence to withstand a motion to quash).
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client confidences in order to comply with the criminal or civil law of
fraud.130
A deontologist would agree that court rules or laws designed to
protect basic human freedoms are important. When a client seeks to
infringe these obligations, the client's conduct is blameworthy, which
creates a valid reason for the lawyer to prevent such a misuse of
others. The scope of such an exception would depend on the extent to
which another categorical right that promotes human flourishing is at
stake. Otherwise, the value of confidentiality in a trusting relation-
ship could be undermined by the utility of majoritarian interests.
For example, it is extremely difficult to justify such disclosure
when the client seeks representation concerning past behavior which
the lawyer had no part in advising. Here, all the reasons to grant
confidentiality apply. We want the client to seek legal help because
we care about efficient operation of the legal system and because we
want the system to afford the client respect through due process rights
as well as devoted client advocacy. On the other hand, the victims of
past client misconduct desperately want access to the information nec-
essary to prove their claims for redress. Although most courts refuse
to make exceptions to confidentiality in this circumstance absent evi-
dence of continuing or future threats of harm, some statutes create
disclosure obligations that can conflict with this view.
One example can be found in criminal law provisions that require
the disclosure of past facts in order to promote law enforcement. For
example, in the classic "buried bodies case," an appointed criminal de-
fense counsel learned from his client the location of several buried
bodies of persons the client, in confidence, told counsel he had killed.
The lawyer went to the site, verified the client's information and pho-
tographed the bodies to preserve the evidence. He did not disclose the
information until the client did, even when confronting a face-to-face
plea from the parents of one of the victims who were searching for
their daughter. When these facts emerged, the lawyer was indicted
for failure to notify authorities of the location of the dead bodies, a
misdemeanor violation of the public health code. The court held that
disclosure by the lawyers would have in effect constituted compelled
disclosure by the client contrary to his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, and dismissed the indictment based on the attor-
ney-client privilege. 13 1
The court noted that its task would have been much more difficult
if the lawyer had violated the obstruction of justice statute by hiding
the bodies. Subsequent cases have held to this distinction between
mere observation of criminal evidence, which is confidential, and tak-
130. See supra note 115.




ing possession or altering evidence, which is criminal unless turned
over to the prosecutor after a reasonable period of time.132
Where future harm may be threatened, disclosure also has been
required. For example, a Texas court upheld the subpoena of a map
the client had provided her lawyer, on the grounds of preventing fu-
ture harm. The client, who had kidnapped a baby, told conflicting sto-
ries about whether the child was still alive, and was unclear whether
the map indicated a gravesite or the place the client had hidden a live
child. The map enabled police to locate the dead child and secure a
conviction for murder.133
Three federal laws create interesting issues regarding the obliga-
tions of lawyers to disclose client information. The first involves Trea-
sury Regulations designed to promote compliance with anti-money
laundering statutes. These regulations require the disclosure of any
cash transaction in excess of $10,000 to the Treasury Department to
enable them to trace large sums of cash, which may be part of a money
laundering scheme. Lawyers have been uniformly unsuccessful in ar-
guing that the client-lawyer privilege exempts them from the require-
ments of this disclosure.134 Courts acknowledge the importance of the
privilege in promoting compliance with the law and facilitating the
administration of justice, but also recognize that the privilege "is not a
license for an attorney to act 'unreasonably' in willfully failing to com-
ply with clear federal law."135 An "asserted possibility" that a client
may be incriminated by disclosure is not enough to prevent it, because
disclosing the name of a client who paid cash does not by itself disclose
any underlying crime.136
Two other recent examples threaten to expand the disclosure obli-
gations of lawyers. The first flows from the USA Patriot Act, passed
after September 11 to respond to terrorist activities. One goal of the
law was to strengthen the initiative of the previously existing Finan-
cial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF"), an inter-gov-
ernmental body designed to promote national and international
policies to combat money laundering. A new initiative of this group,
called the "Gatekeeper Initiative," is directed at professionals, includ-
ing lawyers, whose clients transact domestic and international finan-
cial transactions and business. Should this initiative become law,
lawyers could be required to submit Suspicious Transaction Reports
regarding client activities (currently required of financial institu-
132. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (2000); see
also In re Original Grand Jury Invest., 733 N.E.2d 1135 (Ohio 2000); In re Ryder,
381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
133. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
134. See, e.g., DeGuerin v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
135. Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1997).
136. Id. at 86 (quoting United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d 504 (1991)).
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tions)137 and would be prohibited from telling their clients they had
done so. In some countries, such obligations already apply to lawyers
who manage client money or who assist in the planning or execution of
financial or real estate transactions for clients.
An ABA Task Force recently recommended that requiring lawyers
who receive or transfer funds on behalf of clients "to verify the identity
of clients, maintain records on domestic and international transac-
tions, and develop training programs that would help attorneys iden-
tify potential money laundering schemes" was appropriate.138 The
same group strongly opposes the so-called "tip off' provisions, how-
ever, because they would require lawyers to submit Suspicious Trans-
action Reports to government authorities based on a mere suspicion
that the funds involved in the client's transaction stemmed from some
kind of illegal activity, and would prevent lawyers from telling their
clients they had done so. 139
The most recent example of this tendency of law enforcement offi-
cials to use the criminal law to create exceptions to client confidential-
ity involves the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in which Congress directed the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to draft rules requiring
lawyers "to report evidence of a material violation of securities law" to
those within the corporate family. Proposed SEC Regulations go fur-
ther, however, by requiring such a lawyer to not only inform the board
of directors of a publicly held company, but also to quit and disaffirm
documents previously submitted to the SEC if the entity does not ap-
propriately respond.14o Such a disclosure duty applies both to inside
and outside lawyers and is triggered by a lawyer's "reasonable belief'
that such wrongdoing has occurred or is about to happen.
IV. CONCLUSION
The confidentiality rules always will be controversial because they
protect an important relationship and prevent disclosure of informa-
tion to others who could use it. There seems to be little call for aboli-
tion of the fiduciary obligation, or its litigation equivalent, the client-
lawyer privilege. Most of the controversy has been and will continue
to be played out in discussions about the appropriate exceptions to the
rule and the contours of those exceptions.
137. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2000).
138. ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION, COMMENTS
OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON
THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION PAPER 10 (May 30, 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/comments.doc.
139. Id. at 15.
140. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (Proposed Rule 2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
33-8186.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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In considering whether an exception should exist or what its scope
should be, rulemakers should focus on the underlying purpose of the
obligation in the first place. Utilitarian justifications, which balance
the overall benefits of such as rule against its harms, help clarify
when and how much of an exception to make. Deontological ratio-
nales, which focus on the essential values in the client-lawyer rela-
tionship, often help in clarifying whether client and lawyer are treated
fairly.
Recent revisions to both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and articulations of the larger law governing lawyers in the Restate-
ment indicate renewed efforts to explain and implement core values
that promote service to clients, as well as creating exceptions where
truly serious harm to others justifies disclosure. These efforts are be-
coming increasingly important in the face of new efforts by the govern-
ment to create additional exceptions designed to facilitate law
enforcement, which may neglect the value and purpose of legal
service.
Those of us involved in drafting these rules realize that the task of
articulating these premises is an ongoing process. Every day we see
new examples of the need for confidentiality as well as new examples
of the need for exceptions. We should be most weary of the latter
when the government seeks to make lawyers agents of its law enforce-
ment efforts. But this direct regulation of lawyers will not be obviated
unless lawyers are able to articulate the basis for confidentiality, the
equally important basis for creating exceptions to the professional ob-
ligation, and the reasons why a proposed regulation falls short of
those benchmarks.
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